SUBTLE INFLUENCES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JAILHOUSE INFORMANT TESTIMONY IN CAPITAL CASES by Miles, Wendy Freeman
Capital Defense Journal




INFORMANT TESTIMONY IN CAPITAL
CASES
Wendy Freeman Miles
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wendy Freeman Miles, SUBTLE INFLUENCES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JAILHOUSE INFORMANT TESTIMONY IN
CAPITAL CASES, 5 Cap. Def. Dig. 51 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol5/iss1/24
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1 - Page 51
monwealth claims of future dangerousness. Examples of each type of
instruction follows.
A mitigation instruction might read as follows: "As you deliberate
whetherlife in prison ordeath is appropriatepunishmentforthe defendant's
crime(s), you may consider as a possible mitigating factor that a sentence
of life in prison means that the defendant will: [insert eligibility provision
applicable to your case]
1. never be eligible for parole.
2. not be eligible for parole consideration for twenty-five years.
3. not be eligible for parole consideration for years."
81
A future dangerousness instruction might be phrased: "When you
assess the evidence presented by the Commonwealth in support of its
contention that there is a probability that the defendant will commit future
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society, you may consider the fact that if you set defendant's punishment
at life imprisonment, he will: [insert the eligibility provision applicable to
your case]
1. never be eligible for parole.
2. not be eligible forparole consideration for twenty-five years.
3. not be eligible for parole consideration for - years."'82
Finally, defense counsel should prepare its response to the situation
where the jury interrupts its deliberations to ask about parole or life
imprisonment. 83 This is particularly important if all defense efforts to
introduce evidence or instructions on parole have been prohibited. De-
fense counsel must be prepared to convince the trial judge to give an
81 These sample jury instructions have been drawn from the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Manual, Defending a Capital
Murder Case in Virginia (1992).
82 Id.
83 Such a situation is not uncommon, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
explanation more than, "I can't tell you," or "it is of no concern." First,
defense counsel must object to any such response by the trial judge to
preserve error. Counsel should argue that a responsive answer is critical
because, as indicated by the jury's action, they are already dubious about
what a life sentence actually constitutes, and as such, are more likely to
speculate in their sentencing decision. 84 Second, counsel should press for
one of two types of statements: (1) a flat statement that "life" means the
defendant would be in jail for the rest of his life;85 or (2) an accurate
statement that the defendant would serve twenty-five years in jail before
ever being eligible for parole, or if appropriate would never be eligible for
parole.86 Because a responsive answer to the jury during its deliberations
may be critical to its sentencing determination, counsel must prepare, in
advance, to respond to such a situation.
VIII. CONCLUSION: LIVING WITH THE
CURRENT RULE
It is imperative that counsel challnge the Virginia Supreme Court's
standing on parole in order to ensure that these constitutional claims are not
defaulted. Several options have been presented in this article which
counsel should pursue where it is appropriate for the individual case. If
evidence or instruction on parole are not admitted, counsel should be alert
to any signs that the jury has taken into account that the defendant might
be released on parole despite being instructed to consider the choice as
between life and death. In Harris v. Commonwealth,87 where one of the
jurors explained to the jury how the parole system would come into play
with regard to the various sentences that the jury was considering, the
Virginia Court of Appeals found consideration of parole eligibility by the
jury constituted grounds for impeachment of the jury's verdict. Conse-
quently, counsel should consider having jurors questioned as to whether
the possibility of parole was discussed by jurors while debating between
life and death. Harris provides a limited window of opportunity to claim
error given the current policy of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
84 Virginia's prohibition on parole evidence, questioning, and
instructions is based on the possibility of juror speculation.
85 This may be appropriate since this is a fiction which Virginia
maintains that jurors believe.
86 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C) (1991). See also supra note 5.
87 13 Va. App. 47,408 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
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[lt is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying
falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.
- Napue v. Illinoisl
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Roger Matney, a Virginia jailhouse informant, testified
for the Commonwealth in the capital murder trial against Roger Keith
Coleman. Matney told the court that while sharing a cell with
Coleman, Coleman confessed to the rape and murder of Wanda Fay
McCoy. Matney described a floor plan of the house and mentioned a
1 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
2 See generally Coleman v. Thompson, No. 92-0352-R, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11231 (W.D. Virginia 1992); Smolowe, Must This Man
Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40.
paper towel that the police found beside the victim's body. It is
arguable that Matney's testimony was the Commonwealth's strongest
evidence against Coleman. 2 After testifying, Matney was released
from jail after serving only part of his four concurrent four-year prison
sentences. Matney's mother-in-law signed an affidavit that stated that
Matney said he falsified Coleman's confession. 3 RogerKeith Coleman
3 Coleman v. Thompson, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11231, at *7. See
also Smolowe, Must ThisMan Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40. Matney
denies falsifying his testimony. Coleman, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11231
at *3.
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was executed on May 20, 1992.
4
No one constitutional provision directly governs the use ofjailhouse
informant testimony in a capital murder trial. Capital defense counsel
encountering evidence of this type must rely on a patchwork of rights and
arguments to limit or exclude the testimony of informants. Conse-
quently, counsel must be well-versed in the available legal challenges to
informant testimony that apply to the different situations that may arise.
This article is intended to act as a primer on the different types of
challenges by presenting constitutional arguments against the use of such
testimony at the pretrial, guilt and sentencing stages of capital murder
trials and briefly (since there are few Virginia cases dealing with the issue
of jailhouse informants) discuss Virginia case law on the issue. The
article also provides practical suggestions of how to raise such arguments
at the pretrial, trial and appellate levels.
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
I A. The Triggering of the Right: "Deliberate Elicitation"
If formal judicial proceedings have begun,5 one of the most impor-
tant protections against informant testimony is the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, which the Supreme Court has held applies to both the
trial and capital sentencing phases.6 The Court first developed the
protections in Massiah v. United States,7 where the Court held that a
defendant is denied the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment
when government agents deliberately elicit incriminating statements
from the defendant in the absence of counsel. In that case, the Court
found that the Sixth Amendment had been violated when the defendant
was surreptitiously tape recorded by federal agents with the aid of
Massiah's codefendant. Massiah made clear that the Sixth Amendment
is violated even where the defendant is unaware that he is dealing with
a government agent, with the Court even suggesting that "'Massiah was
more seriously imposed upon.., because he did not even know that he
was under interrogation by a government agent."'
'8
The leading Supreme Court case dealing with the Sixth Amendment
and jailhouse informants is United States v. Henry.9 In that case, the
defendant, Henry, was held in a city jail pending his trial for armed
robbery. Housed in the same cellblock with Henry was Nichols, an
informant paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An FBI agent,
after being informed by Nichols that he shared the same cellblock as
Henry, instructed Nichols to listen for any statements made by the other
federal prisoners but not to initiate any conversations himself. A few
weeks after Nichols had been released from jail, Nichols reported to the
FBI agent that Henry had told him about the robbery. Nichols was paid
for the information.
Nichols testified at trial that Henry had told him details about the
robbery. The jury, which was not informed that Nichols was a paid FBI
informant, convicted Henry of bank robbery. Henry did not learn until
after trial that Nichols was a paid government informant and that he had,
Henry argued, been housed in the same cell as Henry in order to elicit
4 Pressley, SlayerSays Goodbye, The Washington Post, September
16, 1992, atAl.
5 See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,469-70 (1981); Moore
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220,226-27 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688-89 (1972)(plurality opinion).
6 See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Satterwhite v.
Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not apply in this
situation because the jailhouse informant appears to be merely a fellow
inmate; thus, the defendant does not know that he is really talking to an
agent of the Commonwealth. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)
(holding that "an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow
inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before
incriminating information.
The Henry Court viewed the question as whether Nichols had
"deliberately elicited" the incriminating information from Henry.' 0 In
determining that the statements were deliberately elicited, the Court
relied onMassiah and considered three factors important: I) Nichols was
acting as a paid informant; 2) Nichols appeared to Henry to be just
another inmate; and 3) Henry was in post-indictment custody when he
talked to Nichols.l I Using these three factors, the Court found that "[b]y
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incrimi-
nating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government
violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
12
Importantly, in both Massiah and Henry, the Court found that the
question of who initiated the incriminating conversations was irrelevant.
Also of importance is the fact that the Court did not require that the
government act purposefully; the language in Heny - "intentionally
creating a situation likely to induce" 13 - indicates that the intent lies not
in the informant's purposefully eliciting information, but in the
government's creation of circumstances that will probably lead a defen-
dant incriminate himself.
Five years later, in Maine v. Moulton,14 the Supreme Court bol-
stered its holding in Massiah. In Moulton, the defendant, Moulton, and
his co-defendant, Colson, were indicted for theft. Without Moulton's
knowledge, Colson began cooperating with police officers and agreed to
testify against Moulton at trial. Colson informed the authorities that
Moulton had suggested killing one of the State's witnesses. Colson
allowed the police to install a recording device on his telephone. Over
the telephopie the two men discussed the theft charges pending against
them. Colson also agreed to wear a transmitter on his person at a meeting
with Moulton during which the two men discussed the pending theft
charges and, prompted by Colson's questions, Moulton also talked about
his earlier, but by then abandoned, plan to eliminate the State's witness.
The Court found that Colson had elicited the information by methods
such as "frequently profess[ing] to be unable to recall the events....
Apologizing for his poor memory, [Colson] repeatedly asked Moulton to
remind him about details .... [This technique caused Moulton to make
numerous incriminating statements."
15
The State argued that both the telephone conversations and the
conversation that took place during the meeting between the two men
should have been admissible at trial because the police did not intention-
ally set up the conversations. The Supreme Court, however, held that it
is irrelevant who "deliberately elicits" the incriminating information
because the Sixth Amendment "guarantees the accused ... the right to
rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State .... [T]his
guarantee includes the State's affirmative obligation not to act in a
manner that circumvents the protections accorded the accused by invok-
ing this right." 16 Although the Court conceded that if the State obtains
incriminating information "by luck or happenstance" 17 the S ixth Amend-
ment is not violated, it warned that"knowing exploitation by the State of
an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is
as much a breach of the State's obligation.., as is the intentional creation
askinj qt. etions that may elicit an incriminating response.").
377 U.S. 201,206 (1964).
8 Id. (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2nd
Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting)).
9 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
10 14. at 270.
11 14.
12 Id. at 274.
13 Id.
14 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
15 Id. at 165-67.
16 Id. at 174-75.
17 Id. at 176.
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of such an opportunity." 18
In both Henry and Moulton, the informants played an "active" 19
role in eliciting the statements. The informant in Henry "was a Govern-
ment agent expressly commissioned to secure evidence" 20 and did so by
engaging the defendant in conversations. 2 1 In Moulton, the Court found
that the informant encouraged the defendant to make incriminating
statements through surreptitious techniques.22 In both cases the Court
declined to "reach the situation where the 'listening post' [informant]
cannot or does not participate in active conversation and prompt particu-
lar replies." 23
The Court addressed that question in Kuhlmann v. Wilson.24 The
defendant in that case, Wilson, was arrested for robbery and murder and
placed in a cell with a police informant named Lee. Lee was instructed
by a police detective not to ask any questions of Wilson but merely to
"keep his ears open" for the names of Wilson's confederates in the
robbery and murder. Ultimately Wilson admitted that he and two other
men had robbed and murdered the victim, and Lee subsequently reported
these statements to the detective. The trial court denied Wilson's
suppressionmotion, finding that theinformant had obeyed the detective's
instructions not to ask any questions and that Wilson's statements were
"spontaneous" and "unsolicited."
The Kuhlmann Court held that unless the government utilizes
"investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interro-
gation," the Sixth Amendment is not violated by placing a covert
informant in the same jail cell as a defendant.25 An informant's mere
reporting the defendant's incriminating statements to the police is not
enough to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Instead, the
Court stated that "the defendant must show that the police and their
informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks."
'26
After Kuhlmann a defendant, therefore, must be prepared to show
that the informant "took some action, beyond merely listening" to
establish a Sixth Amendment violation.27 Henry andMoulton, however,
also make clear that "some action" need not amount to direct questioning
of the defendant, but can be satisfied by actions and statements "likely to
induce [the defendant] to make incriminating statements."
'28
B. The "Offense-Specific" Requirement
Another potential limitation is that the Sixth Amendment is "of-
fense specific," meaning that it applies only to the offense for which the
formal judicial proceedings have begun.2 9 In Moulton, the Court noted
that even though a defendant has been charged with one crime, the police
still have an interest in investigating new or additional crimes and that
those investigations frequently require surveillance of individuals.
30
Although theMoulton Court recognized that thepotential forabuse in the
form of a "pretextual" investigation, the Court held that statements
concerning unindicted offenses may be admitted in a trial of those
18 Id.
19 Heny, 447 U.S. at 27 1. The Court wrote that "Nichols was not
a passive listener...."
20 Id. at 273.
21 Id. at 270.
22 474 U.S. at 165-66.
23 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 159, n.13; Henry, 447 U.S. at 271, n.9.
24 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
25 Id. at 459.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 459. The California legislature codified Kuhlmann in
§4001.1 of the California Penal Code: "No law enforcement agency and
no in-custody informant acting as an agentforthe agency, may take some
action, beyond merely listening to statements of a defendant, that is
deliberately designed to elicit incriminating remarks."
28 Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
offenses 31 "whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason
for their surveillance.
' 32
The potential for abuse that the Moulton Court acknowledged can
be seen in King v. Commonwealth.33 In that case, the defendant, King,
and his accomplice murdered and robbed a woman and then fled the state.
Two weeks later, the two were arrested together. Although King's
accomplice was arrested for the capital murder, King was charged only
with parole violations. In the intervening two months before King was
formally charged with the murder for which his codefendant had already
been indicted, thepolicevisitedhim on two occasions during which King
made incriminating statements about his involvement in the murder to
the police. King sought to suppress the statements in a pretrial motion.
It could be argued that the police were intentionally creating an
opportunity to violate King's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
arresting him for something other than the capital murder and waiting
two months, during which time he was interrogated about the murder,
before charging him with that crime even though they immediately
arrested and charged his accomplice with it.
The Virginia Supreme Court found, however, that King's right to
counsel had not been violated because "'adversaryjudicial proceedings'
had not yet been initiated on that charge" and, therefore, the right had not
yet attached.34 Thus, by delaying the filing of formal charges against
King, the police were able to interrogate him about a murder, and then use
those statements to convict him without violating his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
In Eaton v. Commonwealth35 the defendant shot and killed four
people (two of whom were a state trooper and Eaton's girlfriend) in less
than 24 hours. Afterwards, he shot himself in the head and was
transported to a hospital. After being released from the hospital, he was
transferred to jail for the murder of his girlfriend, but was questioned
twice about the murder of the state trooper.
While Eaton was in the hospital, the police discovered that Eaton
had been charged with a series of crimes in a different county and that an
attorney had been appointed for him. Those charges were ordered nolle
prosequi, even though no one told eitherEaton orhis attorney. Thepolice
then visited Eaton in the hospital and he made several incriminating
statements. Eaton moved to suppress the statements as violations of the
Sixth Amendment, but the Virginia Supreme Court held that "Eaton's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached with respect to the
murder of Trooper Hines because 'adversary judicial proceedings' had
not yet been initiated on that charge."
'36
Both King and Eaton illustrate the Virginia Supreme Court's
application of the bright-line rule set forth in Moulton. No matter how
suspicious the government's motive in delaying formal charges and then
questioning an accused about the uncharged crime, the Sixth Amend-
ment does not attach until formaljudicialproceedings have been initiated
against an accused.
29 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
30 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179.
31 Id. at 180, n.16.
32 Id. at 180.
33 243 Va. 353,416 S.E.2d 669 (1992). See case summary of King,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
34 Id. at 360,416 S.E.2d at 672 (quoting Eaton v. Commonwealth,
240 Va. 236, 252, 397 S.E.2d 385, 394 (1990) (quoting Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986))). King argued, pursuant to Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), that his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel had been violated in that the police continued to interrogate him
afterherequestedcounsel.416S.E.2dat671-72. Although King claimed
only Fifth Amendment violations, the Virginia Supreme Court reasoned
with Fifth and Sixth Amendment language.
35 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
36 Id. at 252, 397 S.E.2d at 394.
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C. The "Offense Specific" Requirement and
Capital Sentencing
Although the classic case of Sixth Amendment violations involves
an informant's testimony at the guiltstage of trial, theproblem also arises
at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. The problem may be
especially acute where the jailhouse informant's testimony is used as
evidence to prove the "future dangerousness" aggravating factor.
37
The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence of
unadjudicated acts is relevant to proving future dangerousness in the
capital sentencing phase.38 Because the court has held that evidence of
future dangerousness is not limited to the defendant's criminal record,39
this particular stage of a capital murder trial is rife with opportunities for
the Commonwealth's use of informant testimony as to "admissions" and
actions of the defendant while in jail. In several cases, Virginia courts
upheld thejuries' findings of future dangerousness based inpartupon the
testimony of jailhouse informants.40
In Frye v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court held that a
jailhouse informant's testimony during the penalty phase regarding a
capital defendant's planned escape from a county jail was relevant and
admissible to show his future dangerousness. 4 1 The statements were
made by the defendant while incarcerated pending the trial. The trial
court heard the informant's testimony out of the presence of the jury and,
over the defendant's objections, admitted the testimony. The informant,
Armentrout, testified that he frequently spoke to Frye about religion and
that during one of these conversations, Frye asked Armentrout to help in
an escape from the jail. Consequently, Armentrout told a jailor about
Frye's plan to escape and, over time, gave the jailor a note and a map
written by Frye. Armentrout testified that the jailor told him "to suggest
certain information concerning the location and condition of police cars"
when the informant further discussed the plan to escape. The jailor
testified that he never had a deal with Armentrout, but admitted that he
told the informant "he would mention his cooperation to the
Commonwealth's attorney." Frye argued that this evidence was inad-
missible pursuant to Massiah, Henry and Moulton because it was
obtained by knowingly circumventing his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Commonwealth argued that Armentrout was not an agent
of the Commonwealth because he initiated the informant relationship,
not the Commonwealth.
37 Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4(C)(1990). The statute states that
"[t]he penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based
upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circum-
stances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused
that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society .... "
38 Saundersv. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107,111,406 S.E.2d39,44
(1991); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192,201,402 S.E.2d 196,
206 (1991); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 317, 384 S.E.2d
785, 798-99 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); O'Dell v.
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,700364 S.E.2d 491,507, cert. denied, 488
U.S. 871 (1988); Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 346-47, 356
S.E.2d 157, 175-76, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).
39 Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303,329 S.E.2d 807, cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 975 (1985); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 455,
477-78, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865
(1983).
40 Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370,345 S.E.2d267 (1986),see
infra notes 41-46 and accompanying txt. In Saunders v. Common-
wealth, 242 Va. 107,406 S.E.2d 39 (1991, , the court upheld ajailhouse
informant's testimony to prove future dangerousness that the defendant
had broken into a store and stolen items and ftaat the defendant admitted
to killing an unidentified man in the District f Columbia. In Eaton v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 q990); the court allowed
the informant to testify, in order to show future dangerousness, that the
The court found that any evidence obtained through the initial
conversation between the informant and the jailor was admissible
because it was obtained through luck.42 Any statements made after the
jailor knew that Frye would talk to the informant, however, would not be
admissible, provided the statements pertained to the pending charge
of capital murder.43 Because Frye's statements concerned past and
future criminal conduct unrelated to the charge of murder, the court
reasoned, the statements were not obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment and were admissible.44
It may be argued, however, that the Sixth Amendment right cannot
be interpreted as specifically as the Virginia Supreme Court did in Fiye.
In Moulton, the United States Supreme Court held that "incriminating
statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of
those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also inves-
tigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the
Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused right to
counsel." 45 In a footnote, the Court added that "[i]ncriminating state-
ments pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right
has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those
offenses."'46 Moulton thus only stated that the Sixth Amendment did not
apply to a trial of the unindicted offenses and did not address where those
offenses are being used to justify the death penalty for the offenses to
which the Sixth Amendment has attached.
Moreover, in Estelle v. Smith47 and Satterwhite v. Texas,
48 the
Supreme Court found that the Sixth Amendment applied apply to the
defendants' statements to a psychiatrist, from which the psychiatrist then
made his prediction of future dangerousness. 49 The Court reasoned in
both cases that the Sixth Amendment had attached when the doctor
interviewed the defendants because it was a "critical stage" of the
prosecution; 50 therefore the defendants were denied the assistance of
counsel in making the serious decision of whether to submit to the
doctor's questions.
5 1
In a similar fashion, where the state attempts to use statements
concerning other offenses to impose the death penalty for a capital crime
on which the defendant has already been charged, the other offenses can
be seen in effect as part of the capital offense. To not extend Sixth
Amendment protections in this situation would enable the state to
deliberately elicit incriminating statements concerning the other of-
fenses not with an eye towards prosecuting those crimes, but solely to
defendant joked about his crimes and that the defendant made a deadly
weapon to use during an escape he was planning.
41 231 Va. at 392, 345 S.E.2d at 283.
42 Id.
43 Id. The court wrote that "only such statements as incriminate the
defendant on the pending charges are obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment and must be excluded." Id. (emphasis added). See supra
notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
44 Id. at 392, 345 S.E.2d at 282-83.
45 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180.
46 Id. at 180, n. 16 (emphasis added).
47 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981).
48 486 U.S. 249,255-56 (1988).
49 The Court, in a later case, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582
(1990) (plurality opinion), made clear that the Sixth Amendment was
implicated even though the psychiatrist did not have any investigative
interest in the statements themselves, but rather used the statements to
make his prognosis of future dangerousness. Id. at 599, n.13.
5 0 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-70; Satterwhite,486 U.S. at 254-55. The
Estelle Court wrote that "the right to counsel granted by the Sixth
Amendment means that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer 'at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him.., whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information or arraignment." 451 U.S. at 469-70 (quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (plurality opinion)).
51 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469.
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bolster its case for imposition of the death penalty on an already indicted
capital crime.
The Illinois Supreme Court vacated a death sentence based in part
on the foregoing argument. 52 In People v. Kidd, the State introduced at
the penalty stage the defendant's confession to police that he set a fire in
which 10 children were killed approximately four years prior to the
capital murder conviction at issue in the case. Although the police knew
that the defendant was represented by counsel, the attorney was never
notified that the defendant was being interrogated. The Illinois court
found that the pretrial interrogation used to gather evidence for the
penalty hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution and thus warranted
Sixth Amendment protections; although the State was free to use the
incriminating statements to prosecute the arson-murder unrelated to the
capital murder, the court held that introduction of the statements to show
that the defendant was death eligible violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
53
D. Making the Motion to Suppress Under the
Sixth Amendment
Because of the damning nature of jailhouse informant testimony,
Virginia defense counsel should make a motion to suppress the evidence
from the guilt and penalty phases of the capital trial. A motion to suppress
must be filed and notice given to the Commonwealth no later than seven
days before trial.54 In this motion, the defendant will want to argue that
the Commonwealth did more than merely place an informant in the same
cell as the defendant and that the informant did more than merely listen
to the defendant. To bolster its Sixth Amendment argument, the defense
can attempt to show, for example, that the Commonwealth was paying
the informant or promising the informant some type of benefit for the
information and/or that the jailhouse informant had a continuing rela-
tionship as an informant with the state.
55
The most difficult factor to show will probably be that the informant
went beyond merely listening and actually interrogated the defendant.
56
Because the informant has a personal interest in testifying for the state,
the question of whether he merely listened will more than likely be his
word against the defendant's. Therefore, the defense should request an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress and, for this hearing,
subpoena all jail inmates in an attempt to show that informant was not
a mere "listening post."
Virginia defense counsel also should vigorously litigate any at-
tempt to use jailhouse informant testimony to prove future dangerous-
ness. The motion should note that the United States Supreme Court has
held that defendant has a constitutional right to counsel at the penalty
phase of a capital murder trial57 and argue that allowing informant
testimony as to admissions of unadjudicated acts at the sentencing stage
52 People v. Kidd, 544 N.E.2d 704 (111. 1989).
53 Id. at 712-14.
54 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-399 (1990).
55 This type of evidence can be obtained through a motion for
discovery and inspection. See infia notes 106-109 and accompanying
text.
56 Kuhhnann, 477 U.S. at 459.
57 Mempa v. Rhav, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)(holding that sentencing is
a "critical stage" of trial and therefore warrants protections under the
right to counsel).
58 474 U.S. 175.
59 As part of this motion, defense counsel may wish to draw a
parallel to Moulton by stating that the defendant is asking only that
jailhouse informant testimony be suppressed from the penalty phase of
the trial, and not that the Commonwealth be precluded from indicting,
charging and trying the defendant for the unadjudicated acts to which the
of a capital murder trial violates Estelle v. Smith and undermines Moulton
v. Maine's holding that the Sixth Amendment "guarantees the accused
... the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the
State.' 58 The Commonwealth's ultimate purpose in a capital murder
trial is to obtain a sentence of death which often includes a showing of
future dangerousness. Thus any criminal activity relied upon to show
future dangerousness should be seen as part and parcel of the Sixth
Amendment right that has attached to the capital murder charge.
59
III. CHALLENGES TO JAILHOUSE INFORMANT
TESTIMONY BASED UPON RELIABILITY
Many do not realize the ease with which jailhouse informants can
pick up the telephone and collect information on fellow inmates from
prosecutors, bail bondsmen and the police, and then use the information
in perjured testimony at trial.60 A jailhouse informant in California
admitted to providing false information to the authorities in approxi-
mately 100 cases.61 His method for gathering information was to
disguise himself as a bail bondsman and get an accused's case number
and date of arrest from the sheriff's department. 62 Then, masquerad-
ing alternately as a deputy district attorney and a police officer, he
gathered "credible" information and informed the government of a
fellow inmate's "confession. '63 This samejailhouse informant admit-
ted to lying under oath in three of the sixteen cases in which he testified
for the state.64 In exchange for his testimony, the government gave
him privileges such as early release from prison.
65
Because jailhouse informants are inmates themselves and thus
are highly motivated by possible favors from the government in return
for their information, the self-serving nature of this type of evidence
raises questions bearing upon reliability, arbitrariness and the integ-
rity of the criminal justice system.
A. Due Process
Due process claims regarding jailhouse informant testimony
may involve challenges to the use of false testimony at trial, to the
Commonwealth's withholding of information such as evidence of any
favors the informant may have received from the Commonwealth, and
to limitations concerning the cross-examination and impeachment of
jailhouse informants.
The prosecution has the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the defense pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.66 Brady held that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution." 67 Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Court
informant would testify.
60 Berg, Snitch, Cal. Law., Nov. 1991, at 51, 53.
61 Id. at 52.
62 A Snitch's Story, TIME, Dec. 12, 1988, at 32.
63 Id.
64 Snitch, Cal. Law. at 52.
65 A Snitch's Story, TIME at 32.
66 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
67 Id. at 87. The state's turning over evidence to the defendant that
is favorable to the defense ensures the accused a fair trial and "the
Government wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in
courts." Id. at 87, n.2 (quoting Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, Address before
the Judicial Conference of the Fouirth Circuit (June 29, 1954)). The
Court reasoned that the prosecutor's role is to see that justice is done-
not to "win" the case.
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extended the Brady holding to evidence that is "material ... to the
punishment to be imposed."
'68
As a corrolary to Brady, the Commonwealth may not knowingly
rely on false testimony to secure a conviction, whether such testimony
is actively solicited or simply allowed to go uncorrected. 69 In Giglio
v. United States, after the defendant was convicted and sentenced, the
defense learned that the Government may have failed to disclose a deal
it had with its key witness.70 Although the defense attorney attempted
to reveal possible deals the witness may have had with the government
through aggressive cross examination, the witness denied any such
arrangement or agreement. 71 In the government's closing argument,
the prosecutor also stated that the government had made no deals with
the witness. 72 However, the government later admitted that a prosecu-
tor who had presented the case to the grand jury but did not try the case
had made an agreement with the witness; the attorney who tried the case
denied any knowledge of the agreement.
The Giglio Court held that"[w]hether the nondisclosure was a result
of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. The
prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the
Government."'73 More specifically, the Court stated that allowing false
evidence to go uncorrected "is [as] incompatible with 'rudimentary
demands ofjustice"' as "deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the
presentation of known false evidence. ' 74 The Court concluded that
"suppression of material evidencejustifies a new trial 'irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'
75
The Virginia Court of Appeals addressed both Brady and Giglio
claims in Fitzgerald v. Bass.76 The defendant in that case argued that,
despite his specific request, the Commonwealth violated Brady when it
failed to disclose certain information about one Cavaniss, a jailhouse
informant, who testified against him. The defendant contended that the
Commonwealth failed to provide information that would have shown,
among other things, that the informant "was a paid informant for the State
Police on cases not involving Fitzgerald... and that he was reimbursed
for expenses connected with his testimony."
77
Pursuant to Brady, Fitzgerald made a request for:
[A]ny and all evidence of any kind whatsoever, known by the
Commonwealth's Attorney to be within the possession, cus-
tody or control of the Commonwealth, or by the exercise of
due diligence should be known by the Commonwealth's
68 Trombetta v. California, 467 U.S. 479,485 (1984).
69 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
70 The deal was that the witness would not be prosecuted if he
testified for the prosecution identifying the defendant as the instigator of
a forgery scheme. Id. at 150-5 1.
71 Id. at 151.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 154.
74 Id. at 153 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,112(1935)).
75 Id. at 150 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87.)
76 6 Va. App. 38,366 S.E.2d 615 (1988). Fitzgerald was appealing
the denial of his state writ of habeas corpus. Fitzgerald was convicted of
abducting, raping, robbing and murdering a woman.
77 Id. at 47, 366 S.E.2d at 620.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 48, 366 S.E.2d at 620-21.
80 Id. at 48, 366 S.E.2d at 620.
81 6 Va. App. at 48, 366 S.E. 2d at 620-21. The court wrote that
"[tihis is not a situation where the Commonwealth responded falsely that
it was not in possession of exculpatory evidence. Failure to object to such
a response would not bar habeas review since ordinarily counsel would
have no reason to believe that the Commonwealth was, in fact, withhold-
Attorney to be within the possession, custody or control of the
Commonwealth ... which affects the credibility of any of the
Commonwealth's anticipated witnesses.
78
The Commonwealth responded to the motion by saying that it was
"unable to ascertain what may affect the credibility of any of the
Commonwealth's witnesses," which the court of appeals interpreted as
the Commonwealth essentially saying that impeachment evidence was
not subject to discovery.
79
Although the court found that the Commonwealth's response "was
clearly in error," it concluded that Fitzgerald's failure to object to the
Commonwealth's response meant that he had defaulted on the Brady
claim.80 Because of the way the Commonwealth responded - i.e., not
falsely - the court found, in essence, that Fitzgerald had reason to
believe that the Commonwealth was holding such evidence; since
Fitzgerald should have pursued his claim further, the court found that he
procedurally defaulted his claim. 81
No Brady case, from Napue v. Illinois82 onward discusses proce-
dural burdens on the defense when requesting evidence pursuant to
Brady. The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Agurs
that the prosecution has a duty to disclose material evidence where there
was a specific request, a general request, or no request at all from the
defense. 83 The court conceded in Fitzgerald that the evidence asked for
by the defense was material as defined in United States v. Bagley.
84 If
the prosecution has a duty to turn over material Brady evidence whether
the defense requests it or not, it logically follows that failure to do so
warrants review; in other words, the defense cannot default on a Brady
claim.85 Consequently, theFitzgeraldcourt's holding that the defendant
defaulted his Brady claim is highly questionable as a legal holding.
In Fitzgerald, the defendant also claimed that he was denied due
process when the same jailhouse informant, Cavaniss, testified falsely
that he had no pending charges and no prior felony convictions. 86 The
court found that the Commonwealth's attorney had no actual knowledge
of the false testimony, but that it did have constructive knowledge even
though the informant's prior criminal convictions and charges occurred
and were recorded in a different county from the one in which he was
testifying.87 Therefore under Giglio, the court held, a new trial was
required if the informant's testimony was material and if it could have
affected the judgment of the jury."88 The court noted the United States
Supreme Court had stated that this test is the equivalent to the "harmless
ing evidence."
This stresses the need for defense counsel to carefully scrutinize
the Commonwealth's response to a Brady request and make further
motions to clarify what evidence the Commonwealth may have in its
possession.
82 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
83 427 U.S. 104, 111 (1976).
84 6 Va. App. at 49, 366 S.E.2d 620, n.2; Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985).
85 Perhaps the Fitzgerald court was confusing Brady claims with
Virginia's Rule 3A:11. A defendant can default on a Rule 3A: 11 claim.
See Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558
(1980).
86 6 Va. App. at 49, 366 S.E.2d at 621.
87 Id. at 52, 366 S.E.2d at 623.
88 Id. (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959))). The Fitzgerald court wrote that "[e]vidence
relevant to the credibility of a witness is as material in the constitutional
sense as evidence which goes directly to the question of guilt where 'the
jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence."'
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beyond a reasonable doubt" standard set forth in Chapman v. Califor-
nia.89
Because the informant's testimony established an element of the
crime Fitzgerald was charged with,90 the court found the testimony to be
material to the rape conviction in that Cavaniss' credibility in the eyes of
the jury could have determined their verdict.91 The court proceeded to
find the error harmless, however, after considering the informant's
testimony in light of the entire trial, including the nature and strength of
the Commonwealth's evidence compared to the defense's evidence, the
extent of the defense's impeachment of the informant, how "vulnerable"
his testimony would have been had the "truth" been revealed, and
whether any such considerations "could in any reasonable likelihood
have caused the jury to bring in a verdict of not guilty. ' 92 Because the
informant had admitted to a conviction for breaking and entering - a
felony - and to "'something like' a misdemeanor conviction of moral
turpitude ' 93 and had spent time in jail, the court found that the jury was
aware that Cavaniss had "a substantial criminal background."'94 In
addition, since the defense in its closing argument had emphasized the
criminal record to which Cavaniss had admitted, the court found that
there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury's judgment would have
been different had the informant testified truthfully.95 The court noted
that even if the defense had known of Cavaniss' further criminal history
and his status as a police informant, and had argued to the jury that these
gave him a motive to provide false testimony for the Commonwealth, it
was doubtful whether this would have affected the jury's determination
of the informant's testimony.
96
In O'Dell v. Commonwealth,97 the defendant argued that he was
denied his rights to discovery under Napue and Brady when the Com-
monwealth did not disclose a plea agreement between it and one of its
witnesses, ajailhouse informant. In an oblique one-paragraph statement,
the Virginia Supreme Court held that "neither [Napue nor Brady]
indicates a defendant has a right to discover the existence or contents of
a plea agreement prior to trial. Instead, these cases turn upon undis-
closed plea agreements with witnesses who had already testified."
'98
The court, citing Weatheiford v. Bursey,99 held that "there is no general
89 Id. at 53,366 S.E.2d at 623. Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
90 The informant testified that Fitzgerald admitted raping the
victim while the co-defendant and the forensic scientist could not state






96 Id. at 55, 366 S.E.2d at 625.
97 234 Va. 672, 683, 364 S.E.2d 491,497 (1988).
98 Id. (emphasis in original). The court noted that the defendant was
allowed "to fully develop all pre-trial contacts and negotiations [the
informant] had with the Commonwealth. O'Dell was unable to prove a
plea aeement existed between [the informant] and the Commonwealth."
9 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
100 O'Dell, 234 Va. at 682, 364 S.E.2d at 497.
101 429 U.S. at559.
102 Id. at 559-60.
103 Id. at 559-60 (emphasis added). The petitioner in Weatherford
argued that his due process rights were violated when the state decided,
at the last minute, to call as a witness an undercover officer (whose
"cover" had been revealed) who had represented to the petitioner that he
would not testify for the state.
104 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676. See also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112;
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. The Virginia Court of Appeals recognized this
rule in Fitzgerald, 366 S.E.2d at 620, n.2.
Virginia defense counsel who are confronted with jailhouse infor-
constitutional right to such pre-trial discovery in a criminal case." 100
While it is true that Weatherford stands for the proposition that
"[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal
case," 10 1 the United States Supreme Court unequivocally distinguished
Weatherford from Brady.102 The Weatherford Court wrote:
It does not follow from the prohibition against concealing
evidence favorable to the accused that the prosecution must
reveal before trial the names of all witnesses who will testify
unfavorably.... Brady is not implicated here where the only
claim is that the State should have revealed that it would
present the eyewitness testimony of a particular agent against
the defendant at trial."
103
Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court in O'Dell was comparing "apples to
oranges" when it applied the holding in Weatherford to the facts in
O'Dell.
Capital defense counsel should note that, contrary to O'Dell,
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls under the
purview of Brady104 since "[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the




Virginia defense counsel should file, pursuant to the Sixth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Rule
3A: 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia a motion for
discovery and inspection. A motion for discovery and inspection
pursuant to Rule 3A: 11 must be filed 10 days prior to the date fixed for
trial. 106 In this motion, the defendant should request that the trial court
order the Commonwealth to disclose: 1
07
mant testimony should note that defendants have an absolute right under
the confrontation clause to cross-examine a Commonwealth's witness to
show the witness' bias or motivation. Deavers v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 14, 16, 255 S.E.2d 458, 459 (1979), Whittaker v. Commonwealth,
217 Va. 966, 968, 234 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1977), Moore v. Commonwealth,
202 Va. 667,669,119 S.E.2d 324,327 (1961). The right to confrontation
is extended in Virginia to capital sentencing via statute. Va. Code Ann.
§19.2-264.4 (1990). A defendant is also "entitled to prove facts that
would support an inference that such testimony was motivated by a
bargain for leniency granted in a previous trial." Whittaker, 217 Va. at
968, 234 S.E.2d at 81. Further, a defendant has the right to attack the
credibility of a jailhouse informant by showing that the witness has
received or been promised favorable treatment from the Commonwealth
for his or her testimony and, thereby, to show the informant's true motive
for giving such testimony. Deavers, 220 Va. at 16, 255 S.E.2d at 459,
Whittaker, 217 Va. at 968, 234 S.E.2d at 81.
105 Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
106 Counsel should be aware that filing a motion for discovery
pursuant to Rule 3A: 11 entitles the Commonwealth to limited reciprocal
discovery if the defense motion is granted. In Hackman 1. Common-
wealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia cautioned "members of the trial
bar that generally it is advisable to have a court order or written
stipulation specify precisely what is to be discoverable [under Rule
3A:l 1], thereby avoiding misunderstandings that may lead to fatal
consequences on appeal." 220 Va. 710, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1980).
107 Clearly, the content of the motion for discovery and inspection
should not be limited to the suggestions in this article. It should include
requests for all Brady material.
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Any and all consideration of promises of consideration
given to or on behalf of any potential witness or expected or
hoped for by any witness. By "consideration" defendant refers
to absolutely anything, whether bargained for or not, which
arguably could be of value or use to such a potential witness or
to persons of concern to such witness, including but not limited
to formal or informal, direct or indirect: leniency, favorable
treatment, recommendation or other assistance with respect to
any pending or potential criminal, parole, probation, pardon,
clemency, civil, tax court, court of claims, administrative or
other dispute with the Commonwealth, with any other author-
ity or with any other parties; criminal, civil or tax immunity
grants[;] witness fees or special witness fees; provision of
food, clothing, shelter, transportation, legal services or other
benefits; placement in a "witness protection program" or
equivalent benefits; informer status of any potential witness;
and anything else which arguably could reveal an interest,
motive or bias in any witness in favor of the Commonwealth
or against defendant or act as an inducement to testify or to
color testimony.
108
The motion should further ask the court to order the Commonwealth to
disclose the "existence and identification of each occasion on which each
potential witness who was or is an informer.., has testified before any
court, grand jury, or other tribunal or body."1 09 Also, the motion should
request all personnel files that might arguably help the defense impeach
any Commonwealth witness since, at times, informers are paid for their
services by the state.
2. Post-Trial Motions
The defense may not discover until after trial that a jailhouse
informant perjured herself, that the perjury was uncorrected by the
Commonwealth, or that evidence affecting the credibility of a witness
(e.g. that the witness was promised something for her testimony) was not
disclosed. The usual remedy for such claims is a motion for a new
trial. 110 Defense coungel, under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:1, have
until twenty-one days after sentencing to file a motion for a new trial. The
motion should set forth both state and federal grounds for the motion and
show how the defendant was prejudiced by the informant's testimony or
by the Commonwealth's nondisclosure.
If the defendant is denied the right to cross-examine and impeach
the credibility of a jailhouse informant, defense should make a timely
objection on the record. If overruled, defense can use this claim, based
on state and federal law, as a basis for a motion for new trial and as an
issue on appeal. However, such claims are subject to the harmless error
standard: a defendant will have to show that he was prejudiced by the
court's error.
The defendant may also use claims that the informant perjured
himself and/orthat the Commonwealth knew of theperjury as a basis for
108 Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, Defending a Capital
Murder Case in Virginia (1992) at 141-42,.
109 Id. at 142.
110 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153.
111 Va. Code Ann. §8.01-655 (1990).
112 Winograde, Jailhouse Informants and the Need for Judicial
Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 755
(1990).
113 See, e.g., D'Agostino v. State, 823 P.2d 283 (Nev. 1992) and
infra notes 131-135 and accompanying text; McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d
151 (Miss. 1991) (where the court noted that "[ilnformants ... are
offering evidence against their fellow inmates in exchange for reduced
sentences. In the process of reaping their benefit, they are manipulating
the system by helping to convict innocent citizens."); Tibbs v. State, 337
a state petition for habeas corpus relief.111 However, the inmate who
seeks to collaterally attack his conviction may find it hard to obtain the
necessary evidence to do so because he will have to elicit the informant's
admission that the informant perjured himself at trial. Such testimony
would subject the informant to prosecution for perjury and thus the
informant would probably be unwilling to so testify. One commentator
argues that courts should grant use immunity to a jailhouse informant
who, when asked in a habeas proceeding whether he perjured himself at
trial, invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege.112
B. Eighth Amendment
Ajailhouse informant's testimony that results in a death sentence is
also questionable under Eighth Amendment protections against the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The motive for false testimony
is so great in some instances -early release from prison orjail, promises
of lenient sentences or the dropping of charges altogether - that serious
doubt is cast on the reliability of such testimony,1 13 particularly when the
result of this testimony is the punishment of death.
Since the death penalty is unlike a prison term in that, once imposed,
it cannot be modified or vacated, it is cruel and unusual punishment if
imposed arbitrarily. 114 Based on that proposition, the Supreme Court
wrote in Woodson v. North Carolina,115 that "there is a... difference in
the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case." Likewise, in Lockett v. Ohio 1 16 the Court
wrote that the "qualitative difference between death and other penalties
calls for a greater need for reliability when the death sentence is
imposed." Thus, the procedures a state employs to impose the death
penalty must be more reliable than those used in the determination of
other criminal punishments.
117
Virginia defense counsel should argue in their motions to sup-
press 1 18 thatjailhouse informant testimony is so self-serving in nature as
to be inherently unreliable and thus in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Barring this type of testimony from the penalty stage of a capital
trial would ensure the high standard of reliability that is constitutionally
required. 119
To ensure the heightened standard of reliability required pursuant
to Woodson120 and its progeny, Virginia defense counsel should file a
motion for discovery and inspection pursuant to state and federal law. 121
Since Brady requires discovery of exculpatory or material evidence
relevant to the punishment to be imposed as well as to guilt, the
Commonwealth has a duty to disclose any information relevant to
rebutting the informant's testimony as to future dangerousness at the
penalty stage (i.e. mitigating evidence). Such evidence may include the
Commonwealth's providing leniency, favorable treatment, recommen-
dations for parole, early release or payment for his testimony in the
capital case. Counsel should argue that Virginia courts have the authority
to order a broad range of discovery, going beyond that required pursuant
to Rule 3A: 11. Should the trial court deny the motion or the Common-
wealth fail to disclose the requested information, defense counsel should
So.2d 788 (Fla. 1976) (where the court found that the informant's
testimony appeared to be "the product ofpurely selfish considerations.").
114 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion).
115 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (footnote omitted).
116 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
117 Woodson, 428 U.S at 305.
118 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
119 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. Defense
counsel should also argue that testimony by informants as to the
defendant's future dangerousness was obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment.
120 428 U.S. at 305.
121 See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
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make a specific and timely objection on the record, citing both state and
federal grounds for their objection.
D. Judicial Rulings Requiring Corroboration
The integrity of the judicial system is undermined when a defen-
dant is sentenced to death solely or partly on the basis of uncorroborated
jailhouse informant testimony. When an informant testifies that the
defendant "confessed" to the capital crime or to unadjudicated acts, the
prejudicial effect is "harmful in the extreme and cannot be overlooked by
the reviewing court." 122 Some state courts have recognized and de-
signed rules of law to combat the unreliability of jailhouse informant
testimony. Defense counsel, therefore, should not hesitate to argue
against informant testimony not only on constitutional grounds, but also
on the basis of general evidentiary and fairness principles.
In D'Agostino v. State, 123 the defendant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death by a jury. During the penalty phase of the trial,
the state called D'Agostino's cellmate to testify that the defendant had
admitted to several other unadjudicated killings. According to the
informant, D'Agostino admitted to killing a man and slitting a woman's
throat, but the jailhouse informant could not give specifics as to the time
or place of the murders.
The Supreme Court of Nevada noted the frequency of jailhouse
informants coming forward to testify for the state and decided that it was
time to examine the practice carefully. 124 The court found that in
D'Agostino there was no way that the defendant could have defended
himself against such unverifiable accusations. 125 The court held that
testimony as to "admissions" of past unadjudicated homicides by the
defendant is inadmissible unless "the trial judge first determines that the
details of the admissions supply a sufficient indicia of reliability or there
is some credible evidence other than the admission itself to justify the
conclusion that the convict committed the crimes which are the subject
of the admission."
126
In Eaton, the Supreme Court of Virginia alluded to the necessity of
corroborating jailhouse informant testimony. 127 Eaton argued that the
evidence in the guilt phase of his trial was insufficient to establish that he
was the "triggerman" as required by Virginia law for capital murder.
128
Although the court upheld the use of the informant testimony, it did so
only after noting that "[diespite Eaton's attack on the credibility of
Holley as a 'jailhouse snitch,' Holley's testimony was corroborated in
several respects: first, the circumstantial evidence.., second, Eaton's
murderous career.. and third, Eaton's statements to the police...".
129
Requiring corroborating evidence for an informant's testimony as
to "admissions" enhances the integrity of the judicial system. 130 Cor-
roborated jailhouse informant testimony, as opposed to self-serving
uncorroborated testimony, enhances the overall reliability of a capital
conviction. This type of requirement does not undermine the state's
interest in investigating crimes that was recognized in Moulton
13 1
because it does not ban the state's use of informants. The state may still
take advantage of fortuitous evidence offered by jailhouse informants,
122 D'Agostino v. State, 823 P.2d 283,285 (Nev. 1991).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 284.
126 Id. at 285.
127 240 Va. at 254, 397 S.E.2d at 396.
128 The jailhouse informant testified that Eaton talked about each
of four killings at length, admitted to shooting a state trooper and told the
informant details about a high speed chase and automobile accident
following the murder of the state trooper. Id. at 244, 397 S.E.2d at 389.
129 Id. at 254, 397 S.E.2d at 396.
130 The need for corroboration of jailhouse informant testimony
and the requirement for evidence that tends to prove that what the
informant is offering is true only serves to make the ultimate investiga-
tion of the "confessed" crime more trustworthy. Virginia defense
counsel should object to uncorroborated informant testimony in that the
prejudice of such unreliable testimony severely outweighs its probative
value. In their motion to suppress the informant's testimony, counsel
should request an evidentiary hearing to determine what corroborative
evidence exists for the testimony.
E. Techniques for Combatting the Impact of Informant Testi-
mony: Voir Dire and Jury Instructions
Voir dire is an essential tool defense counsel can employ to guard
against the inherent unreliability of ajailhouse informant's testimony at
the trial and penalty phases. Defense counsel should ask potential
jurors:
132
1. Do you believe that itis fair for anindividual who is accused
of a crime to testify against another, and as a result of his
testimony receive from the Commonwealth [a reduced or
lenient sentence / charge(s) against him dropped / early
release from prison or jail]?
2. Do you understand that an individual's testimony may be
motivated by his desire to avoid criminal charges?
3. Do you feel you are capable of scrutinizing and analyzing
each witness' testimony for their reason or motivation for
testifying?
Defense counsel should argue that because the jury determines whether
to impose a life sentence or the death penalty, the capital defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and the Eighth Amendment
heightened reliability standard set forth in Woodson requires that such
questioning be allowed. 133 Likewise, one of the basic principles of due
process is that the defendant has the right to a fair and impartial jury.
Defense counsel should argue that they are constitutionally mandated,
via the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, to make
informed decisions about potential jurors and to ensure the jurors'
impartiality once they are empaneled. Thus the defendant has the right
to meaningful voir dire.
Once the jury has heard the informant's testimony, counsel should
attempt to highlight for the jury the informant's lack of credibility.
Although an effective and necessary arena forpointing out the unreliability
of the testimony is the closing argument, defense counsel should also
submit to the court jury instructions regarding the credibility ofjailhouse
informant testimony. One example of such an instruction is as follows:
The testimony of [a jailhouse] informant should be viewed
with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating such testimony,
can be analogized to the requirement for corroborating evidence and/or
witnesses for the crime of solicitation that states recognize. See, e.g., Cal.
Penal Code §653f(e) (West 1988).
131 474 U.S. at 179.
132 Defense counsel should tailor their questions to fit the facts and
circumstances of their particular cases.
133 InMorgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct2222 (1992), the Supreme Court
held that a defendant's sixth amendment right includes the right to
explore any misconceptions jurors may hold which would affect their
sentencing decision. See case summary of Morgan, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue.
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you should consider the extent to which it may have been
influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any benefits
from the party calling that witness. This does not mean that
you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should
give it the weight to which you find it to be entitled in the light
of all the evidence in the case.
134
Defense counsel should always proffer cautionary instructionp when the
Commonwealth's case depends in part on untrustworthy evidence.
Defense attorneys should argue that, under the Eighth Amendment
heightened reliability standard, 135 the trial court is mandated to allow
such instructions to resist the inherent unreliability of jailhouse infor-
mant testimony.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A DATABASE
ON JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
Common sense would dictate that defense counsel advise their
clients not to talk to anyone in jail and warn them of the consequences of
talking to cellmates. However practical this advice, it is frequently not
realistic because "confinement may bring into play subtle influences that
will make [an individual] particularly susceptible to the ploys of under-
134 Cal. Penal Code §1 127a (West 1988). The State of California
mandates that this jury instruction be read upon request of eitherparty "in
any criminal trial or proceeding in which an in-custody informant
testifies as a witness." Id.
135 InFord v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Court held that
cover Government agents." 136 Advising the capital defendant not to talk
is also not sufficient because, clearly, jailhouse informants are excep-
tionally motivated to fabricate confessions of their fellow inmates.
The problems Virginia defense counsel encounter when faced with
the use ofjailhouse informant testimony at a capital trial are numerous.
This article has outlined a variety of constitutional and evidentiary
challenges that might be raised. As a practical matter, one of the hardest
problems to overcome is gathering evidence on the informant that
supports motions to suppress and that may be used to impeach the
informant's credibility. One practical remedy for these hurdles would be
the creation of ajailhouse informant database among defense attorneys
containing information such as how many times an informant has
testified for the Commonwealth, what the informant's status is with the
state (e.g. paid informant), what benefits the informant has received in
the past for testimony, and the informant's past convictions. An existing
database would also serve as a source of documentation for future
legislation. Until such a database exists, an attorney faced with a
jailhouse informant may want to circulate a letter to other defense
attorneys in the area requesting any information that they might have
concerning the informant.
"[in capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that
factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability"
(emphasis added).
136 Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
